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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of action, the court allows proof of the plaintiff's negligence. s Chief
Justice Stacy carefully avoids use of the term "contributory negligence"
which would be an affirmative defense in bar,0 but in a previous de-
cision by the same jurist, the definition given would so characterize the
present defense.' 0 The effect of this decision is that the negligence of
plaintiff and defendant are compared to arrive at the proper damages.'"
The rule applied where judgment is on a verdict of the jury, that con-
tributory negligence must be pleaded and that it bars the plaintiff's ac-
tion,' 2 is abandoned. Will the decision therefore foster a new body of
law which dispenses with the necessity of giving plaintiff notice of
defenses by pleading them, and to be applied or ignored in the discre-
tion of the court? That implication necessarily follows, for in the ab-
sence of a consistent line of authority the trial judge must use his own
notion of justice in deciding whether a particular defense, affirmative
or not, relates to the question of damages.
The limitation on the defendant's time for pleading, obviously neces-
sary to insure trial of the case, occasions no hardship which calls for
the instant ruling; for even after judgment has been rendered, he may
have the case reopened for excusable neglect. Grounds therefor are
specified by statute.'8 Thus it is difficult to see why the North Caro-
lina court must depart from logic and precedent to give the defendant
additional advantages on the inquiry.
MAURICE V. BARNEILL, JR.
Real Propety-Status of Proceeds of Sale of Real Estate
Held by the Entirety.
Husband and wife sold real estate of which they were seised by
the entirety. The husband took the money thus received and placed it
8 DeHoff v. Black, 206 N. C. 687, 690, 175 S. E. 179, 181 (1934). In illustrat-
ing, Judge Stacy says, "Upon execution of the inquiry, B offers to show how the
accident occurs, not to escape his liability of a penny and costs established by the
judgment, but to show that A's damages, over and above the amount fixed by
the default judgment, was the result of a self-inflicted injury (not contributory
negligence). .. "
"West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 184 N. C. 179, 113 S. E.
672 (1922).
"West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 184 N. C. 179, 113
S. E. 672 (1922).
1 The doctrine of comparative negligence has not heretofore been recognized
in this state except in cases coming within the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
and our own statute, N. C. CoDE ANNr. (Michie, 1931) §3467, which relates to ac-
tions by employees against common carriers; Moore v. Chicago Bridge & Iron
Works, 183 N. C. 438, 111 S. E. 776 (1922).
1N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §523.
13N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §600; the statute declares that the judge
shall relieve the defaulting party where there has been "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
in a bank to his credit. On his death the widow claimed all by virtue
of survivorship and secured a judgment against the estate for the full
amount. Pending an appeal from this judgment the bank became
insolvent. The appeal having been abandoned and the personalty prov-
ing inadequate, the widow now petitions for sale of the decedent's real
estate to make assets to pay her judgment. Held, thq estate holds the
entire amount of the money as trustee for her and she as a creditor is
entitled to the sale.'
Upon conversion, by sale or otherwise, of realty held by the
entirety2 into other forms of property, what status do these new assets
assume-? This question is important for it ultimately determines: (1)
The right of survivorship, since there must be an estate by the entirety
for such right to exist.3 (2) Rights of the creditors of the individual
spouse, since as long as the estate by the entirety exists these creditors
have no valid claim on the assets. 4 (3) Right of each individual spouse
to do with his part as he pleases, for this is possible, only where no estate
by the entirety exists.5
At common law this problem in its present-day form did not exist,
for once the realty was turned into personalty the husband was the
absolute owner thereof.6 Many states today recognize estates by the
entireties in personalty of any character ;7 others recognize such estates
in personalty consisting of proceeds received from the sale.of realty
thus held.8 In the latter jurisdictions the courts say that an estate
by the entireties existed in the realty, and that the proceeds received
therefrom should stand in the place of the realty and should also be
held by the entireties 9 until a division by the parties is had.' 0 Accord-
ingly, estates by the entireties have been held to exist in assets such as
Place v. Place, 206 N. C. 676, 174 S. E. 747 (1934).
This problem would arise only in those states that recognize estates by the
entireties in realty: Ark., Ind., Mich., Mo., N. Y., N. C., Ore., Pa., S. C., Tenn.,
and Vt. PowEL, CASES ON POSSESsoRY ESTATES (1st ed. 1933) 290, n. 4.
' Survivorship is generally abolished in joint tenancies by statutes. N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1735.
' Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245, 34 Am. St. Rep. 254 (1879). For the rights
of creditors generally in estates by the entireties see Martin v. Lewis, 187 N. C.
473, 122 S. E. 180 (1924); Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924).
But see Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 312, 39 N. E. 337 (1895).
1 Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. C. 202, 13 S. E. 790 (1891); Jones v. Smith,
149 N. C. 318, 62 S. E. 1092 (1908).
02 KXNT CoMM. 143; Gooch v. Weldon Bank & Trust Co., 176 N. C. 213; 97
S. E. 53 (1918).
"Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).; Brewer v. Bowersox, 92
Md. 567, 48 Atl. 1060 (1901) ; Note (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1017. Contra: Winchester-
Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 194 N. C. 698, 140 S. E. 622 (1927).
8Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N. E. 117 (1924).
it re Blumenthal's estate, 119 Misc. Rep. 588, 196 N. Y. S. 764 (1922);
Citizen's Say. Bank and Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 99 Atl. 250 (1916).
" Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923).
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bonds and purchase-money mortgages,"1 undivided money from the
sale of the land,12 money from the sale of lumber cut from the realty,'8
money received from insurance of the premises, 14 money from the sale
of realty which was later invested in business,15 money from the sale of
real estate which was later used to purchase more realty in the hus-
band's name,16 money borrowed on realty held by the entireties,17 and
surplus money accruing from the sale under a mortgage foreclosure of
land held by the entirety,' 8 A minority take the position that the estate
by the entirety is undesirable because it is contrary to the policy
expressed by the Married Women's Acts,'0 defeats a general policy
against survivorship, 20 and exempts property from the debts of the
individual spouse;21 therefore these courts refuse to recognize estates
by the entireties in personalty even where such is derived from the
conversion of realty held by the entireties. Following this reasoning,
estates by the entireties have been held not to exist in bonds and pur-
chase-money mortgages,2 2 undivided money from the sale of realty,2 8
and a note given to the husband and wife secured by a mortgage on
realty owned by a third party.
24
The North Carolina Court in the instant case holds that an estate
by the entirety exists in money received from the sale of realty. In
the earlier case of Moore v. Trust Co.2 5 money received from the sale
o, realty held by the entirety was divided and placed in two different
banks to the credit of the wife. The Court held that no estate by the en-
tirety existed in money thus divided, but refused to commit itself as to
the status of the money had it not been divided. However, Justice Clark
in a concurring opinion held that when the land was turned into money
the estate by the entirety ceased. In a case four years later the Court
probably answered the question left open in the above case when in
Turlington v. Lucas,26 where the 'husband and wife conveyed to a third
party realty held by the entirety and in return received bonds secured
n Boland v. McKowen, 189 Mass. 563, 76 N. E. 206 (1905) ; Fielder v. Hovard,
99 Wis. 388, 75 N. W. 163 (1898).
" Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 Atl. 635 (1923).2 Morris v. Morris, 210 Mich. 36, 177 N. W. 266 (1920).
14 Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537 (1916).
George v. Dutton, 94 Vt. 76, 108 Atl. 515 (1920).
"Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527 (1906).
'Union and Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hudson, 147 Ark. 7, 227 S. W 1 (1921).
"Hill Top Savings and Trust Co. v. Worley, 16 Pa. Dist. 250 (1906).
In re Albrecht's Estate, 136 N. Y. 91, 32 N. E. 632 (1892).
'Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
Gooch v. Weldon Bank & Trust Co., 176 N. C. 213, 97 S. E. 53 (1918).
'Central Trust Co. v. Street, 95 N. J. Eq. 278, 127 Atl. 82 (1923).
Bremer v. Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148 (N. D. N. Y. 1934).
" Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Ore. 430, 219 Pac. 804 (1923).
"Moore v. Trust Co., 178 N. C. 118, 100 S. E. 269 (1919).
" Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
by a deed of trust, it held that an estate by the entirety did not exist in
those bonds since they were personalty and no estates by the entirety
existed in personalty in North Carolina. It seems that this Court is
willing to say that money received from the sale of the realty is held
by the entireties while bonds thus received are not so held. It is doubt-
ful if any satisfactory distinction can be made, since both are person-
alty and a bond "smacks" more of the realty than does money especially
where the bond is secured by a deed of trust.
The Court in the principal case, clinging to the view that estates
by the entireties exist in money received from the sale of realty so held,
and intent on preserving the integrity of such estates, goes further and
holds that a trust is set up in favor of the widow for the whole amount.
Trusts, other than those expressly created by the parties, are usually
declared by the courts (1) where an intent that one should arise is pre-
sumably inferable from the conduct of the parties, or (2) to prevent
a wrongful enrichment.27 It is suggested that in the present case a
trust cannot be predicated on either of these two grounds. By holding
that a trust exists the Court is giving the widow a preferred claim
against the estate where the fund was dissipated through no fault of the
husband or his administratrix. This result would work a hardship on
the husband's bona fide creditors if the husband's estate should be found
to be insolvent, since the widow's preferred claim would have to be
settled in full before the creditors could receive anything.
A better result would have been reached by holding that the widow
was a mere creditor of the estate to one half the amount. This would
have carried out the probable intention of the parties as to a division
of the fund. At the same time it would have obviated, as to the money,
any further consideration of the undesirable legal consequences flowing
from an estate by the entirety.
ROBERT BOOTH.
Sales-Passing Title to Part of Fungible Goods-What
Constitutes Fungible Property.
The defendant company had stored in different warehouses 513,517
bags of beet sugar, each of the same standard and weight. During the
year 1917 the defendant entered contracts for the sale of 190,374 bags,
on which no payment was made before 1918, and which were not set
apart from the other bags nor delivered until 1918. The Federal income
tax upon the proceeds of these sales was computed as upon funds ac-
cruing in the fiscal year 1917. In 1925 on the contention that title did
not pass to the vendees until delivery in 1918, and hence that the tax
I Bo(mET, TRusTs (lst. ed. 1921) 92; MArLAND, EpuiTy (1st. ed. 1920) 73.
